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LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY - JURY BEHAVIOR. 
By L. Craig Parker. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 1980. Pp. 
vii, 185. $22.75. 
In Legal Psychology, L. Craig Parker presents an overview of the legal 
and psychological concepts of eyewitness testimony and jury behavior. The 
author attempts to integrate the discipline of psychology into legal practice 
in order to overcome the reluctance of the legal profession to employ psy-
chological concepts. After a brief outline of the other contexts in which 
these disciplines interact, Parker examines a large volume of psychological 
research pertaining to two discrete areas - eyewitness testimony and jury 
behavior. As a complement to these studies, he reviews Supreme Court 
decisions relevant to these subjects. Unfortunately, his discussion only in-
frequently goes beyond this sum'llary format. Parker fails to suggest any 
guidelines for the practical application of psychology to the practice oflaw. 
Legal Psychology is, consequently, unlikely to have a significant impact on 
either psychological or legal literature. 
Parker first attempts to provide some background on the interface of 
law and psychology. He begins by briefly summarizing the legal-psycho-
logical overlap involved in areas ranging from eyewitness testimony to legal 
socialization. This is followed by a historical survey of those psychological 
studies with legal implications. This somewhat haphazard section leaves 
the lay reader overwhelmed, not only by the large number of studies sur-
veyed, but also by their tenuous relevance to the book's subject matter. Al-
though this survey may be of interest to psychologists, it is too unwieldly to 
be of use to lawyers. Parker does underscore the undeserved nature of the 
legal field's ambivalence towards psychology, but, in general, this overview 
of the interface fails to give the lay reader the intended background. 
Parker then examines the field of eyewitness testimony in detail. His 
thesis throughout is that the present legal rules ignore the research conclu-
sions: judges and juries are insensitive to the inaccuracies that are part of 
most eyewitness testimony (p. 30). Parker finds it incongruous that the ju-
diciary continues to stress the weight of eyewitness testimony when both 
experimentation and actual mistaken identifications demonstrate that this 
testimony is frequently inaccurate. 
Parker focuses on the variables that might result in differing eyewitness 
testimony for identical situations. Unfortunately, these variables, which 
range from race to religion, sex to socioeconomic background, are 
presented through an unorganized series of experimental results. 1 Parker 
underlines an experimental variable as affecting eyewitness testimony and 
applies his talent for criticism to the experiment's methodology. This leaves 
the reader confused as to the actual significance of these variables. A sec-
tion on the importance of these variables and their applicability to the legal 
I. One reviewer indicates that Parker's list of experiments was not comprehensive and 
omitted studies that had contributed significantly to this particular field. See Wells, Gaps and 
Canyons in Psycho-Lego/ Research (Book Review), 27 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1982). 
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issues surrounding eyewitness testimony2 would have been helpful. The 
judiciary is unlikely to adopt psychological principles without guidelines 
for accurately doing so. 
This failure to provide direction is even more apparent in Parker's sec-
tion on memory testing. The research in this area presents excellent pos-
sibilities for practical application in a legal context. Parker surveys studies 
ranging from the effect of mug shot displays on memory retention (interfer-
ence) to tests on the comparative accuracy of identification between artist's 
sketches and composite portraits. An experiment on the number of incor-
rect identifications resulting from the nonverbal cues of the person con-
ducting the trial identification seems, for example, an obvious candidate for 
legal implementation. Parker again declines the opportunity to summarize 
this psychological data in a way that would indicate a direction for legal 
reform. 
Parker does attempt, through Supreme Court decisions,3 to illustrate the 
legal perspective on eyewitness testimony. He finds that the decisions fluc-
tuate from excellent analyses applying recent psychological studies4 to deci-
sions based solely on intuition. 5 A case not discussed by Parker 
underscores his frustration with legal rulings. In United States v. Crews6 
the Cou1t, without the benefit of psychological studies, held that a witness' 
courtroom identification rested on an independent recollection and was not 
the result of illegally obtained pretrial identification.7 The research in this 
area, however, indicates that the initial identification becomes a reinforce-
ment for all future identifications. The illegal pretrial identification would 
then prejudice the defendant at trial (p. 110). This supports Parker's theme 
that the courts often ignore or reject the findings of experimental 
psychology. 
Yet Parker again fails to provide proposals to remedy the deficiencies. 
He points out that the Court has attempted to safeguard defendants by re-
quiring the presence of a lawyer at the identification. The lawyer, however, 
is unlikely to know how to protect his client in this situation. Parker 
stresses the prejudice and bias which pervades many identifications, but he 
fails to provide practical instruction for the lawyer who has a client in a 
lineup. Parker merely discusses suggestions, such as videotaped lineups, 
made by other commentators without recommending any (pp. 110-15). 
Parker thus adds very little to the understanding or prevention of inac-
curate eyewitness identifications. Legal commentators have long recog-
nized the unreliability of this sort oftestimony.8 The key legal problem-
2. Parker has been criticized for failing to discriminate between variables that can be used 
in a practical context and those that have only questionable value for those in the legal field. 
Id at 56. 
3. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby 
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
4. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967). 
5. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). 
6. 44S U.S. 463 (1980). 
7. 445 U.S. at 473. 
8. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Le-
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devising procedures to reduce the risks of erroneous identifications without 
crippling criminal law enforcement - has already been resourcefully un-
dertaken by other observers.9 The need, therefore, is less for another dem-
onstration that eyewitness testimony is suspect than for the political 
determination to do something about it. Parker's book is highly unlikely to 
contribute to this last objective. 
Parker next examines the research and legal practice on jury decision 
rules. After a succinct review of the Supreme Court cases on jury size and 
unanimous decisions, 10 Parker again enters the realm of psychological liter-
ature.11 He emphasizes that when the courts have used psychological stud-
ies in their rationale, they have often relied on research of limited 
credibility. Parker does an excellent job of pointing out the weaknesses in 
the experiments on jury decision rules. Weaknesses include the homogene-
ity of the subject sample (frequently college students) as opposed to the 
heterogeneous sample required for jury selection, and the inherent differ-
ences between deciding a hypothetical case and an actual case. Again, the 
thorough criticism of these psychological hypotheses leaves the reader inse-
cure as to their importance. The overall thrust of the results is that the 
decisions of a six-person jury and a non unanimous twelve-person jury may 
infringe upon a defendant's rights. Parker stresses, however, that because 
of "outstanding weaknesses" these studies are of questionable value to the 
judiciary (p. 141). This subject, however, does illustrate the promise of ex-
perimental research on legal issues. Parker emphasizes the limitations of 
this research without minimizing psychology's potential. The reader is left 
with the hope that future research may resolve the lingering uncertainty. 
Parker also analyzes some of the research on jury behavior. He divides 
his analysis into two sections. First he reviews the studies on nonlegal fac-
tors, such as sex, race and status, that can influence jury decisions. Unfor-
tunately, the data generated by these studies seems too piecemeal to 
advance knowledge much beyond the intuitive level. Parker's next section, 
on the use of social scientists in jury selection, reinforces this skepticism. He 
comments on the legal arguments espousing the dangers of stacking the 
jury. Parker, however, hesitates to give any credence to the alleged benefits 
of experimental psychology to jury selection procedures. Lawyers should 
note that in order for psychological techniques to have any significant ef-
fect, the psychologist must have an unusually comprehensive background 
in this area and the evidence must be sufficiently ambiguous for jury biases 
to influence the ultimate decision. Until further developments occur in this 
vine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap ftom Wade to Kirby, 121 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973). 
9. See, e.g., Sobel,Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse 
of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261 (1971) (suggesting, 
among other things, "blank lineups" - lineups in which the suspect does not initially 
participate). 
10. Recent cases that Parker does not include in his discussion are Burch v. Louisiana, 441 
U.S. 130 (1979) (The Court held that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution that permit-
ted nonunanimous six-person jury decisions were unconstitutional.), and Brown v. Louisiana, 
447 US. 323 (1980) (The Court held that the decision in Burch was retroactive.). 
II. Wells suggests that psychologists may find M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977), a more 
thorough work on jury behavior. Wells, supra note I, at 56. 
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field, Parker suggests that the intuition of the individual lawyer may be just 
as productive a tool for jury selection as experimental psychology. 
An additional chapter tying these loose ends of psychological research 
together would be useful to both lawyers and psychologists. While Parker 
bemoans the reluctance of lawyers to use psychology, the reader is left un-
sure of what Parker feels should be psychology's contribution to the law. 
He outlines flaws in the research, but does not deal directly with the con-
cerns of lawyers. A legitimate concern is that psychological studies are 
oversimplified and, therefore, are not applicable to real life situations (p. 
17). As a summary of recent Supreme Court law and psychological studies, 
Parker's presentation is often unorganized. The reader is required to decide 
for himself which principles are relevant to the legal problems. The disci-
pline of legal psychology has a vast opportunity for selecting those experi-
mental results that are valid and designing methods of applying them to 
legal procedure. A better understanding of legal issues, however, is impor-
tant to any book hoping to influence psychology's effect on the law. Legal 
Psychology fails to address the concerns of lawyers, and hence fails in its 
intended goals. 12 
12. Parker's book is also reviewed by Wells, supra note 1. 
